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within the context of Kantian morality in Kritik der praktischen Vernunft and Kantian 
legal theory in Metaphysik der Sitten. Kleist doubted that humans could really understand 
the world and use reason to find truth, as he indicated in one of his letters that he gave up 
on finding a “Schatz der Wahrheiten” or an ability to find truth in the world. Michael 
Kohlhaas is a novella by Kleist that deals with the question of justice in the positive law 
and forming moral decisions. Since Kant addressed morality within the context of 
Kantian practical principles or maxims in his Kritik der praktischen Vernunft and his 
philosophy of law in Metaphysik der Sitten, these two texts are particularly helpful in 
gaining further insight into Kleist’s novella Michael Kohlhaas. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 “Der Staat sichert uns unser Eigentum, unsre Ehre und unser Leben; wer sichert 
uns aber unser inneres Glück zu, wenn es die Vernunft nicht tut?” This question that 
Heinrich von Kleist (1777-1811) posed to his sister Ulrike von Kleist in a letter to her in 
May of 1779 demonstrates that Kleist was preoccupied with the role that reason played in 
our experience in the world around us and how it relates to our happiness and well-being. 
Kleist was a German author whose works were influenced by the ideas of the 
Enlightenment, which encouraged the developed of man’s ability to use reason and the 
importance of empirical experiences and how they are connected to well-being. 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1824), an important figure to post-Enlightenment philosophy, also 
thought that reason was central to man’s understanding of the world and himself, but by 
the same token considered empirical knowledge to have limits in facilitating one’s 
understanding of the world. Kleist is known to have been familiar with Kant’s ideas, and 
it is thought that Kleist suffered a “Kant Crisis” when exposed to his thought. Kleist’s 
response to reading Kant has been noted to be  
[p]erhaps the most notorious emotional crisis in German 
literary history. […] Kleist believed that he could no longer 
differentiate between appearances and reality. A life plan 
was worthless. The crisis left him, in the words of Michael 
Hamburger, ‘at the mercy of Energy divorced from 
Reason’ (Leiter 561-62). 
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Kleist’s career as a writer at times led him to question the idea of reason and 
whether understanding is in fact still possible after reading Kant. Kant wrote extensively 
on morality in Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 
and Metaphysik der Sitten. In these works, Kant develops his system of morality; in 
Kritik der praktischen Vernunft he explains how moral decisions can be reached through 
reason and forms his Categorical Imperative. In his work Metaphysik der Sitten, Kant 
discusses reason within the context of the positive law (Rechtslehre) and virtue 
(Tugendlehre).  
Although evidence of Kleist’s reception of Kant essentially is contained in a few 
short statements in letters written from 1800-1801, his crisis also influenced his literary 
works. Some scholars have asserted that Kleist in fact misread Kant. In Kant’s Kritik der 
reinen Vernunft, he addresses transcendental structures of knowledge, and rejects the 
traditional metaphysical search for things as they are. Kant organized knowledge in terms 
of appearance and “universal conditions of appearance, instead of in terms of appearance 
and its particular essence” (Phillips 1). Kleist seems to have overly fixated on the Kantian 
notion of the Ding in sich and did not seem to fully understand Kant’s epistemological 
theories within the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Phillips 1). 
  Despite the suggestion that Kleist may have misunderstood Kant, Kleist’s work is 
often read within the context of his Kant Crisis. This thesis will follow in that tradition 
and give a close reading of Kleist’s novella “Michael Kohlhaas” within the context of 
Kantian morality in Kritik der praktischen Vernunft and Kantian legal theory in 
Metaphysik der Sitten. Kleist doubted that humans could really understand the world and 
use reason to find truth, as he indicated in one of his letters that he gave up on finding a 
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“Schatz der Wahrheiten” or an ability to find truth in the world (2:633). “Michael 
Kohlhaas” is a novella by Kleist that deals with the question of justice in the positive law 
and forming moral decisions. The heart of all legal disputes is essentially the question of 
what happened, or in other words, what is the truth of the matter? In Kleist’s 
correspondence with Wilhelmine, Kleist commented that one can never be certain that 
what one insists is true, actually is true (Phillips 22):   
Testifying to the transformation of contingent truth in 
modernity into a demonic force, Kleist turns his back on 
the communicable truth of appearances (Erscheinung) to 
make a pact with the genius of error (Schein) in the thing in 
itself (Phillips 21). 
One’s struggle with contingent truth, or understanding of the empirical world, is certainly 
apparent in Kleist’s novella “Michael Kohlhaas.” For example, the legal problems for the 
protagonist Kohlhaas begin with his failure to produce a Schein, which means 
“certificate” but it could also be a play on the verb scheinen, or “to seem.” This sort of 
ambiguity arises quite often in “Michael Kohlhaas” and reflects that Kleist was struggling 
with the notion of what one can really understand. Since Kant addressed morality within 
the context of Kantian practical principles or maxims in his Kritik der praktischen 
Vernunft and his philosophy of law in Metaphysik der Sitten, these two texts are 
particularly helpful in gaining further insight into Kleist’s novella “Michael Kohlhaas.”  
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CHAPTER II 
 
MICHAEL KOHLHAAS AND THE POSITIVE LAW 
 
Kleist based his novella Michael Kohlhaas on a historical figure Hans Kohlhase 
who lived in the 16th century  (Burkhardt 7). Although the original Hans Kohlhase was 
not a Roßhändler, but rather a seller of honey, beer, and fish, he had his horses taken 
from him at a toll booth and refused to pay his fine eventually because a disturber of the 
peace in Saxony (Burkhardt 10). Kleist’s novella is loosely based on this historical story, 
which like the historical Hans Kohlhase, demonstrates how legal and political 
circumstances can turn an otherwise rechtschaffender man who did not realize he needed 
a Paßschein to cross the border to Leipzig into a violent criminal. The circumstances in 
“Michael Kohlhaas“ are what complicates things for his cause; so much so that at times it 
is ambiguous whether Kohlhaas really is guilty and that he deserves his eventual 
punishment. In the novella, it has been argued, empirical data cause the confusion 
surrounding Kohlhaas’ lawsuit: 
The stories are unsettling in part because they show people 
decisively affected by erroneous but plausible stories told 
about them when they were haled before the law. The 
empirical data, that everyone agrees on, can be put together 
this way or that way, and there is a disastrous tendency for 
the data to be put together erroneously, through malice, by 
accident, or just by application of normal assumptions 
about probability- „Wahrscheinlichkeit.“ [...] When we 
read one of Kleist’s stories, we are reading a story about the 
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disastrous legal consequences of story-telling and story-
reading (Miller 308). 
The narrative of “Michael Kohlhaas“ questions the idea of human perception and 
empirical knowledge with regards to the positive law. After being exposed to Kant’s 
philosophical ideas, it is speculated that Kleist’s Kant Crisis caused him to question the 
certainty of morality originating in Enlightenment principles. Kant taught Kleist that  
incipient perspectivism attaches to all impressions received under terms of human 
experience of the world. For human perception does not involve any progressive melding 
of outer world with a subject’s inner experience of it on the assumption of a pre-
established harmony. Rather, valid perceptions result only when conditions under which 
a circumstance can be experienced at all one scrupulously tested (Mehigan 23- 24). 
In other words, Kleist was considered to have a “profound skepticism about knowledge 
and reason” (Mehigan 33). For Kant, legality is created through reason, however for 
Kleist, the nature of legality “centers on how legal claims are justified for ordinary 
citizens” (Mehigan 70).  
Kant published Metaphysik der Sitten in 1797, in which he explains his political 
and moral philosophy of justice. The work is divided into two parts: the Rechtslehre and 
the Tugendlehre. The Rechtslehre is Kant’s proposal of how political and civil rights 
should be organized within the context of the positive law. Because both the Rechtslehre 
and Kleist’s novella “Michael Kohlhaas” address the positive law and an individual’s 
relationship to it, this chapter will analyze Michael Kohlhaas’ legal struggle through the 
lens of Kant’s Rechtslehre to show how Kleist was struggling with Kantian reason. 
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Kleist shows in the character Michael Kohlhaas how even the most 
rechtschaffende person can be driven to become a lawbreaker, or as Kleist words it, 
“einer der […] entsetzlichsten Menschen.” Kleist creates situations that confront Kant’s 
ideas regarding freedom and the positive law, and the consequences of rebellion; 
ultimately Kleist’s novella brings Kant’s views of political and civil rights into question. 
According to Mehigan, this opening description of Kohlhaas 
is a conundrum not untypical of Kleist’s narratives as a 
whole. Contrasts are initially drawn in stark opposition to 
one another and propel the narrative to a conclusion that 
may or may not involve a resolution of such opposites. The 
story announces a psychological dimension, inviting the 
reader to investigate Kohlhaas’ character in search of an 
answer to the conundrum (Mehigan 72). 
Kohlhaas’ adherence to the laws of Brandenburg before he begins his rebellion 
does not bring him protection or what Kant takes to be freedom, but rather he determines 
that there is no order in Brandenburg and chooses to rebel against the unjust state. Kant 
would disagree with Kohlhaas’ rebellion; however the novella ends with Kohlhaas 
receiving the death penalty, which is according to Kant an appropriate punishment for 
individuals who revolt against the state. Kohlhaas receiving a Kantian punishment for his 
actions makes the Rechtslehre relevant to the events of the novella. Kohlhaas throughout 
the novella goes through a cycle of accepting, rejecting, and then reaffirming the 
institution of the positive law in Brandenburg; this raises important questions relating to 
Kant’s Rechtslehre by explaining how men come together to form societies with public 
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compulsory laws to protect them from the state of nature. Kohlhaas’ rebellions cause him 
to leave society and he considers himself an outcast, yet he immediately accepts the 
social order once he is granted an amnesty. Kohlhaas reverts back to his lawless, 
rebellious state only to reaccept society’s laws before his execution. Kohlhaas’ 
circumstances cause him to at times live in a Kantian state of nature and at times to 
adhere to the Brandenburg laws. Kant explains that the state of nature for men outside of 
society is not one of absolute injustice or Ungerechtigkeit, but rather one where justice is 
not regulated, or Rechtslosigkeit (MS 151). The Rechtslehre focuses not on how people 
should ethically interact, but rather on “how they can be forced to interact as a matter of 
right” (Ripstein 162).  
The novella introduces a situation that addresses Kant’s ideas that a citizen’s right 
to freedom does not mean that one can have the right to deal with issues as an active 
member of the state (such as reorganizing it or introducing certain laws on one’s own), 
but rather that one may merely be involved in the process of enacting positive laws as 
long as the laws contribute to the freedom and equality of the people (MS 154). As 
Michael Kohlhaas makes his way into Saxony, he learns of a new law that he is forced to 
comply with as he tries to pass a tollbooth he had never seen before: “als er an die Elbe 
kam, und bei einer stattlichen Ritterburg, auf sächsischem Gebiete, einen Schlagbaum 
traf, den er sonst auf diesem Wege nicht gefunden hatte” (4). Perplexed by the sudden 
appearance of the tollbooth, Kohlhaas queries the man working there and learns that the 
tollbooth worker has Landesherrliches Privilegium on behalf of Junker Wenzel von 
Tronka (4). Kohlhaas is initially suspicious of complying and only after learning that the 
tollbooth has authority to operate under the existence of a sovereign power, does 
  8 
Kohlhaas agree to pay the toll. At this point, a Burgvoigt suddenly appears that Kohlhaas 
will need a Paßschein if he would like to cross the border.  Because Kohlhaas was a 
rechtschaffender and law abiding citizen, his lack of awareness of a new law in 
Brandenburg shocks and embarrasses him. Not only did he not have a Paßschein in his 
possession, but he had never needed to present one in the multiple times he has crossed 
the border into Saxony. The Burgvoigt explained to Kohlhaas that “die Verordnung 
deshalb erst neuerlich erschienen wäre” (5).  Kohlhaas’ request to speak to the Junker 
von Wenzel personally about this matter shows a bit of suspicion and demand for 
justification with regards to the legislative process in this state. Kohlhaas’ reluctance to 
take the Burgvoigt’s demands at face value is analogous to Kant’s ideas regarding a 
citizen’s right in exercising freedom and equality in a sovereign nation (MS 154). Kant 
explains that freedom and equality do not mean that citizens have the right to deal with 
issues as an active member of the state (such as reorganizing it or introducing certain 
laws), but rather that they may merely be involved in the process of enacting positive 
laws as long as they contribute to the freedom and equality of the people (MS 154). 
Although the law supposedly already has been passed, Kohlhaas inquiring into its 
creation and verifying it with a higher authority is an example of a Kantian freedom that 
citizens may choose to practice. 
At this point in Kleist’s novella, Kohlhaas is not trying to change or resist the 
Burgvoigt’s insistence that Michael Kohlhaas present him a Paßschein. As Kohlhaas 
explains his situation to the Junker Wenzel von Tronka, he immediately takes interest in 
Kohlhaas’s horses and searches for them through the window. The Junker completely 
ignores Kohlhaas’ concerns and instead demands to go down and have a look at the 
  9 
horses. Although the Junker himself is not “the state,” he has authority from a sovereign 
power to exercise a certain amount of authority at Tronka Castle. Thus, the first 
interaction with a higher authority for Kohlhaas is a negative one and as we first get to 
know the Junker we learn that he has more interest in Kohlhaas’ horses than in listening 
to his concerns as a citizen. 
Kohlhaas acknowledges that he must comply with this new law even if he is 
unhappy about it, which exemplifies Kant’s idea that citizens must give up certain 
freedoms to live in an orderly society (MS 151). Citizens gain the freedoms they gave up 
back under protection of the sovereign (MS 151). If all citizens lived how they wanted 
and did not give up basic freedoms, then everyone would live in a state of 
Rechtslosigkeit. Kohlhaas is able to cross the border one time without a Paßschein, as 
long as he is able to get one as he is returning from Dresden and leave behind his Rappen 
to ensure he will return (7). Although Kohlhaas is very unhappy about this arrangement, 
he understands that he has no choice and feels that he must endure the Junker’s abuse: 
“Der Roßkamm, der wohl sah, dass er hier der Gewalttätigkeit weichen musste, entschloß 
sich, die Forderung, weil doch nichts anders übrig blieb, zu erfüllen” (8). This passage of 
the story merely reiterates how Kohlhaas both understands and accepts how citizens of a 
state give up their lawless freedom for the freedom afforded by protection in a sovereign 
state. Kohlhaas grudgingly obeys the Junker’s wishes as he leaves his collateral behind 
until he can comply with the new law requiring him to have a passport. Kant calls the 
concept of men giving up their original freedom as they have it in the state of nature to 
form a society the Original Contract (MS 154). As soon as men form a society, they 
receive their freedom back through the protection of the sovereign. Kant sees in this 
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exchange of lawless freedom for freedom in a sovereign nation not a sacrifice, but rather 
a gain of order and dependence (MS 155). So, Kohlhaas at this moment feels that he is 
protected by the sovereign and thus should expect to feel dependent on an orderly society 
if we follow a Kantian perspective. 
The situation with the Paßschein however shows that Kleist is not only concerned 
with Kant’s idea that adhering to laws will result in bureaucratic order, but arguably also 
with Kant’s views on prescriptive law-making. Kant explains that laws must represent an 
objectively necessary action, which would therefore make the action a duty, and it must 
also be subjectively connected to our choices (MS 218). If a law is objectively necessary, 
then one ought to do it, and if it is subjectively connected to us, then we have an incentive 
to follow the law. Incentives for following a law may be greater freedom or avoiding 
punishment. The Paßschein law raises the question as to whether the law is objectively 
necessary and whether one should be motivated to follow it. As soon as Kohlhaas gets to 
Dresden, he finds the Geheimschreiberei and learns “dass die Geschichte von dem 
Paßschein ein Märchen sei” (9). The secretaries however give Kohlhaas “einen 
schriftlichen Schein über den Ungrund derselben“ (9). Kohlhaas’ receipt of “einen 
schriftlichen Schein” instead of a Paßschein points out either the deceit of the officials at 
Tronka Castle or the bureaucratic inconsistencies and inefficiencies of the state. The mix-
up with the various Scheine makes the law not only seem arbitrary, but also the mere 
existence of Scheine themselves. Kohlhaas ends up explaining that he could not obtain 
the Paßschein, and he gets his horses back anyway. Thus, the Paßschein law seems to be 
neither objectively necessary, nor is it subjectively connected to Kohlhaas, yet he follows 
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it anyway. Because there seems to be no real incentive to follow the Paßschein law, it 
would not withstand any sort of Kantian scrutiny.   
Kleist also references Kant’s ideas that citizens can improve government function 
by complaining to higher authorities (MS 154, 158). As Kohlhaas returns to retrieve his 
horses and present the Schein to Tronka Castle, he discovers that his horses are rail thin 
because they were used to help plow the fields due to a cattle shortage (10). Kohlhaas is 
enraged and exclaims to the Burgvoigt:  
Wer hat dem Junker von Tronka und dessen Leuten die 
Erlaubnis gegeben, sich meiner bei ihm zurückgelassenen 
Rappen zur Feldarbeit zu bedienen? Er setzte zu, ob das 
wohl menschlich wäre? (10) 
Just as when he first saw the tollbooth, Kohlhaas queries the Burgvoigt again as to 
where the authority for the treatment originates. He is met with the response that 
Kohlhaas should be happy that at least the horses are still alive. This passage seems to 
show a tension between Kohlhaas’ expectations of justice and the Burgvoigt’s reaction 
that Kohlhaas does not even have the right to ask that question, but rather should even 
thank God for forgiveness. Kohlhaas struggles, yet he is able to keep ahold of his 
righteousness:  
Es drängte ihn, den nichtswürdigen Dickwanst in den Kot 
zu werfen, und den Fuß auf sein kupfernes Antlitz zu 
setzen. Doch, sein Rechtgefühl, das einer Goldwage glich, 
wankte noch; er war, vor der Schranke seiner eigenen 
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Brust, noch nicht gewiß, ob eine Schuld seinen Gegner 
drückte (11). 
Kohlhaas maintains his dignity as a righteous citizen, yet he questions authority. 
Kleist seems to be responding to the ambiguity between two Kantian ideas: 1) that 
citizens should on the one hand be able to complain about unjust conditions imposed by a 
sovereign, and 2) also respect authority and not reason too much regarding the origin of 
the supreme power of the land (MS 154, 158). Kant states that citizens should obey laws, 
regardless of their origin (MS 158). He believes that citizens inquiring too much into the 
origin of powers and therefore the origins of laws are engaged in aimless pursuits and are 
also a danger to the state, demanding of the citizen “der jetzt bestehenden gesetzgebenden 
Gewalt gehorchen zu sollen; ihr Ursprung mag sein, welcher er wolle” (MS 158).  
As he returns home, Kohlhaas contemplates filing suit in court against the Junker 
von Wenzel. His continued participation in the justice system shows that he has faith in 
being heard as a citizen and that he takes the positive law to exist to serve him: 
Hier verfasste er, mit Hülfe eines Rechtsgelehrten, den er 
kannte, eine Beschwerde, in welcher er, nach einer 
umständlichen Schilderung des Frevels, den der Junker 
Wenzel von Tronka, an ihm sowohl, als an seinem Knecht 
Herse, verübt hatte, auf gesetzmäßige Besrafung desselben, 
Wiederherstellung der Pferde in den vorigen Stand, und auf 
Erstatz des Schadens antrug, den er sowohl, als sein 
Knecht, dadurch erlitten haben. Die Rechtssache war in der 
Tat klar (19).  
  13 
Even after Kohlhaas’s suit gets thrown out, he still has faith in the positive law by 
appealing his case.  
“Am Abend, da sich der Roßkamm, seinem Befehl gemäß, 
zu ihm aufs Schloß begeben hatte, sagte er ihm, dass er nur 
eine Supplik, mit einer kurzen Darstellung des Vorfalls, an 
den Kurfürsten von Brandenburg aufsetzen, den Brief des 
Advokaten beilegen, und wegen den Gewalttätigkeit, die 
man sich, auf sächsischem Gebiet, gegen ihn erlaubt, den 
landesherrlichen Schutz aufrufen möchte (22). 
Kohlhaas’ outlook on being able to resolve his case appears ambiguous. The passage 
dealing with Kohlhaas and his wife, for example, demonstrates how citizens who are 
upset with an unjust sovereign (or his agents) can struggle with this idea. At first, 
Kohlhaas finds that his country is uninhabitable for him, because thus far for his case the 
fictitious Paßschein law has proved that the positive law is not only unreliable, but the 
dismissal of his suit has demonstrated that the justice system is unavailable to Kohlhaas. 
Feeling betrayed by his nation, his first reaction is to leave Brandenburg because he does 
not feel protected by the state. Kohlhaas’ idea to leave his country for a different one is 
similar to the fundamental idea behind man’s motivation to form a society that Kant 
discusses at the beginning of the Rechtslehre. Kohlhaas even tries to sell his house 
because he does not want to live in a society that does not protect his rights and even 
comments that he would rather be a dog than a man forced to live under such conditions 
(27). Kohlhaas’ wish to be a dog means that he does not feel that he is living amongst 
rational beings as according to Kant. For Kant, all justice and laws are applicable to 
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rational beings that are capable of acting from purely moral motives, which means that 
one has moral freedom. Kohlhaas’ comment that he may as well be a dog indicates that 
he feels he cannot act with moral freedom because the law in Brandenburg is not 
responsive to his claims. Despite Kohlhaas’ rechtschaffende qualities and adherence to 
Brandenburg’s laws, the Rechtlosigkeit that Kohlhaas experiences makes him feel like he 
is living in a Kantian state of nature. Kohlhaas’ attitude is a slight foreshadowing that he 
will ultimately reject the state he lives in due to his inability to have fair access to the 
positive law rights available to him as a citizen of Brandenburg, however for now he 
keeps his faith in the legal system of the state he lives in and believes in the righteousness 
of his nation and the outcome of his case.  
With the encouragement of his wife, Kohlhaas’ optimism shows that he 
understands at this point in the novella the importance of the necessity to navigate the 
framework of justice already present in his society: 
Der Herr selbst, weiß ich, ist gerecht; und wenn es mir nur 
gelingt, durch die, die ihn umringen, bis an seine Person zu 
kommen, so zweifle ich nicht, ich verschaffe mir Recht, 
und kehre fröhlich, noch ehe die Woche verstreicht, zu dir 
und meinen alten Geschäften zurück (28). 
Lisbeth insists that Kohlhaas try one more time to settle the matter with the Elector; she 
even suggests that she deliver the Bittschrift personally. She attempts to deliever her 
husband’s Bittschrift for him and at first Kohlhaas refuses because “der Landesherr ist 
vielfach umringt, mancherlei Verdrießlichkeiten ist der ausgesetzt, der ihm naht.” (29) 
Kohlhaas’ response shows that he doubts that she will get through to the sovereign 
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because of the great many people that surround him. However, he eventually agrees 
because Kohlhaas believes that the Elector himself is just, even if the people surrounding 
him are not (29). Lisbeth’s idea to deliver the Bittschrift personally ultimately results in 
her death as she is struck by a lance because a guard thought she was too bold. “Es 
schien, sie hatte sich zu driest an die Person des Landesherrn vorgedrängt […] die 
Bittschrift war ihr nachher durch einen Ritter abgenommen worden (30). Although 
Lisbeth was able to deliver Kohlhaas’ Bittschrift, it was only at the expense of a fatal 
injury. At this point, Kleist further complicates Kohlhaas’ legal situation by causing him 
to suffer personal loss in order to access the bureaucratic systems in place which are there 
to protect Kohlhaas’ freedoms. Kleist seems to be bringing into question Kant’s ideas 
regarding a citizen’s right to exercise freedom in a sovereign nation (MS 155). Lisbeth 
approached the sovereign with the Bittschrift because they are both dependent on the 
state, yet Lisbeth’s fatal blow to her chest with a lance shows a lack of justice and order 
provided to them. Lisbeth’s eventual death shows how just because a citizen gives up 
certain freedoms in order to live in a Kantian state of freedom and equality does not mean 
that citizens will actually live in an orderly or free society. The personal loss for Michael 
Kohlhaas further adds to the legal injuries he has already suffered with the abuse of his 
personal property in the form of the horses. 
 On Lisbeth’s death bed, she takes the Bible from a minister of the Lutheran faith 
and reads to Kohlhaas, “Vergib deinen Feinden; tue wohl auch denen, die dich hassen” 
(31). Kohlhaas then thought, “so möge mir Gott nie vergeben, wie ich dem Junker 
vergebe!” (31) The passage that Lisbeth reads to Kohlhaas suggests that it is not worth 
obtaining revenge in order to achieve justice, which would also be what Kant would 
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argue. Kant does not condone violent rebellion, even if the sovereign is unjust. As an 
alternative to rebellion, Kant explains that citizens may make complaints or objections to 
the sovereign’s injustices (MS 158-159). 
Wider das gesetzgebende Oberhaupt des Staats giebt es 
also keinen rechtmässigen Widerstand des Volks; denn nur 
durch Unterwerfung unter seinen allgemein 
gesetzgebenden Willen ist ein rechtlicher Zustand möglich; 
also kein Recht des Aufstandes (seditio), noch weniger des 
Aufruhrs (rebellio), am allerwenigsten gegen ihn, als 
einzelne Person (Monarch), unter dem Vorwande des 
Missbrauchs seiner Gewalt (tyrannis), Vergreifung an 
seiner Person, ja an seinem Leben (monarchornachismiis 
sub specie tyrannicidii). Der geringste Versuch hierzu ist 
Hochverrath (proditio eminens), und der Verräther dieser 
Art kann als einer, der sein Vaterland umzubringen 
versucht (parri- cida), nicht minder, als mit dem Tode 
bestraft werden (MS 160). 
Kant says that a nation’s citizens must tolerate any abuse of the sovereign, even if it 
unbearable because resisting the highest legislative authority will always be in violation 
of the law, which then in turn destroys the legal foundation of a nation (MS 160). 
Resistance is only allowed if public law allows it; however, Kant points out that this is 
unlikely because issues between the sovereign and a citizen can in essence never be 
mediated: “Wer denn in diesem Streit zwischen Volk und Souverain Richter sein sollte?” 
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(MS 160). Kleist creates numerous unjust obstacles for Kohlhaas, which, beginning with 
the arbitrary Paßschein law and leading to his wife’ death, cause Kohlhaas to lose faith in 
the legal foundation of his country, and thus he no longer wants to tolerate any more 
abuse than what he has already suffered. Kohlhaas’ rejection of the Bible passage 
foreshadows that he will seek revenge and also reject the laws of the land, which Kleist 
clearly indicates after Kohlhaas buries his wife. Kohlhaas “übernahm sodann das 
Geschäft der Rache,” which is the start of his threatening decrees that he sends directly to 
the Junker Wenzel von Tronka (32). Kohlhaas sidesteps the higher authorities because 
not only have they already denied him, but Kohlhaas seems to think of himself in a 
higher class as well and therefore feels entitled to make strong demands for his legal case 
in whatever way he sees fit. Kohlhaas’ sense of entitlement begins after Lisbeth’s death, 
since for her funeral he orders an elaborate coffin for her that “weniger für sie, als für 
eine Fürstin schien” (31). His insistence and determination to get his case to reach the 
authorities subsequently gets only stronger. 
Kohlhaas is able to achieve some victories in his rebellion; this is an example of 
Kleist demonstrating how if the sovereign fails to protect the masses, the masses may 
lose faith in the state. During Michael Kohlhaas’ rebellion, the Sheriff tries to protect the 
town, however it was managed so poorly that the state’s resistance only managed to 
strengthen Kohlhaas (39). This is because the Sheriff’s failure to defeat the entsetzlichen 
Wüterich gave Kohlhaas a stronger militant presence in Brandenburg and exposed 
weakness in an entire police force against Kohlhaas and the small band of men that he 
was able to gather to help him in his cause. The Sheriff tried to assure the people that 500 
men under Prince Friedrich of Meissen were already on their way to guard Wittenberg 
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from any further harm from Kohlhaas, yet he acknowledged that a decree like this would 
never pacify the people (39). The failure of the police force to protect Wittenberg 
demonstrates the Kantian idea that rebellion interrupts the order of society and 
government and thus should be avoided at all costs. However, Kleist’s novella challenges 
Kant’s ideas about rebellion to the extent that the novella demonstrates a situation where 
the rebellion seemed to start because the government already seemed disorderly and 
therefore the citizens did not feel protected under the sovereign. While Kant 
acknowledges in Metaphysik der Sitten that such a situation calls for change, he does not 
envision that change to be of revolutionary character.  
None other than Martin Luther tries to persuade Kohlhaas to reenter the order of 
society (46). Luther’s presence in a discussion regarding positive law is interesting within 
the context of the 16th century when the novella takes place because at this time there 
was a transition going on from religious, church ruled communities into a more 
secularized form of laws. Luther takes the position of Kant and condemns his rebellion. 
Luther argues that the state officials who originally suppressed Kohlhaas’ petition are not 
the supreme authority, so Kohlhaas cannot validly claim that he has been denied 
protection of the law or any sort of due process: 
Wie kannst du sagen, dass die dein Recht verweigert 
worden ist, du, dessen grimmige Brust, vom Kitzel 
schnöden Selbstrache gereizt, nach den ersten, 
leichtfertigen Versuchen, die dir gescheitert, die Bemühung 
gänzlich aufgegeben hat, es dir zu verschaffen? (47) 
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Luther’s point is that the sovereign does not even know Kohlhaas’ name, so he cannot 
say that he was unjustly treated (47). The scene with Luther demonstrates Kohlhaas’ 
willingness to embrace the positive law, yet he refuses to give up his maxim. Kohlhaas’ 
faith in the positive law is temporarily restored as he is promised amnesty by Luther, yet 
when he asks Luther for a blessing, Luther will only do so on the condition that Kohlhaas 
forgive the Junker Wenzel to which Kohlhaas refuses (50). Kohlhaas even tries to back 
his position with scripture, which is consistent with Kohlhaas feeling that he is above 
society as a sort of Erzengel.  
“Hochwürdiger Herr,” sagte Kohlhaas errötend, indem er 
seine Hand ergriff, “nun?” “der Herr auch vergab allen 
seinen Feinden nicht. Laßt mich den Kürfursten, meinen 
beiden Herren, dem Schloßvoigt und Verwalter, den Herren 
Hinz und Kunz, und wer mich sonst in dieser Sache 
gekränkt haben mag, vergeben: den Junker aber, wenn es 
sein kann, nötigen, dass er mir die Rappen wieder dick 
füttere (54). 
Although Luther is a religious figure, his position is the position of the state.  Like 
Kant, Luther argues against breaking the law because the law affirms itself, even if it is 
arbitrary. Kohlhaas’ refusal to forgive the Junker Wenzel demonstrates that he is still 
obsessed with his maxim to the point that he refuses to give up. Interestingly Kohlhaas 
would agree to forgive the other state officials for mishandling his case; however his 
refusal to forgive the Junker shows that Kohlhaas finds the Junker Wenzel responsible for 
Kohlhaas’ feeling that he has been cast out of society. Kohlhaas believes that his 
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rebellion is not a crime because he has been cast out of society, so he cannot be subject to 
the laws of that same society. Luther again takes the position of Kant, claiming it is 
impossible to be cast out of society, however Kohlhaas disagrees: 
“Verstoßen,“ antwortete Kohlhaas, indem er die Hand 
zusammendrückte, „nenne ich den, dem der Schutz der 
Gesetzt versagt ist! Denn dieses Schutzes, zum Gedeihen 
meines friedlichen Gewerbes, bedarf ich, ja, er ist es, 
dessenhalb ich mich, mit dem Kreis dessen, was ich 
erworben, in diese Gemeinschaft flüchte, und wer mir ihn 
versagt, der stößt mich zu den hilden der Einöde hinaus, er 
gibt mir, wie wollt Ihr das leugnen, die Keule, die mich 
selbst schützt, in die Hand“ (50-51). 
So, Luther’s position that Kohlhaas cannot be cast out of society because the sovereign 
never received his complaint reinforces the idea found in Kant’s Rechtslehre that 
members of society can be forced to interact as a matter of right. Immediately after he 
does so, Kohlhaas puts down his weapons and disbands his men, however Luther shows 
doubt that he will be taken seriously. With this situation, Kleist once again seems to be 
referencing the notion in the Rechtslehre that men come together to form a society to 
protect them from a Kantian state of nature, however if one leaves society and wishes to 
come back, it is unclear whether this is even possible. According to Kant, one cannot 
leave and then reenter society. Luther ultimately grants him an amnesty not because he 
personally sympathizes with Kohlhaas, but because the public opinion was on his side as 
well (55). According to Kant, a people may not participate in organizing or running the 
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government, however Kleist shows here that sometimes the people do influence the 
government, or at least those who speak on its behalf. 
With the subsequent events surrounding the Elector’s receipt of the letter, Kleist 
demonstrates the extent to which the state’s decision-making process is arbitrary and 
flawed. The different opinions of the various officials demonstrate that there is no clear 
standard to which Kohlhaas must be judged. For example, Der Kämmerer Herr Kunz 
gives the excuse that he was misled by Junker Wenzel, which is why he threw out the 
case (56).  “Wenn er sie nicht, durch falsche Angabe verführt, für eine völlig grundlose 
und nichts nutzige Plackerei gehalten hätte, kam er auf die gegenwärtige Lage der Dinge 
(56). Despite this, Herr Kunz points out that this mistake did not justify Kohlhaas’ 
actions. Herr Kunz wanted to punish Kohlhaas and that Junker Wenzel should fatten his 
horses. Herr Kunz’s insistence to push the blame on someone else emphasizes the idea 
that the state does not have clear responsibilities delegated to its members, since Herr 
Kunz did not feel the need to examine the matter any further and simply took Junker 
Wenzel’s words at face value. Kleist seems to be casting doubt on Kant’s idea that a 
system of government must divide up certain responsibilities into a judiciary, legislative 
and executive power. In Brandenburg, it is unclear as to where the separation lies, if there 
even is one. Der Großkanzler des Tribunals, Graf Wrede thought that the only way to 
deal with Kohlhaas was to respect him and to make good the mistake the state made (56-
57). Thus, Graf Wrede is advocating for a restoration of the due process owed to 
Kohlhaas. And finally, Prinz Christian von Meißen feels that since state order has been so 
disrupted, the state needs to move beyond the institution of the courts and instead create a 
band of men to crush him.  
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Die Ordnung des Staats sei, in Beziehung auf diesen Mann, 
so verrückt, dass man sich sie schwerlich durch einen 
Grundsatz aus der Wissenschaft des Rechts entlehnt, werde 
einrenken können (57). 
Meißen also suggests that Herr Kunz, along with various other officials, be 
arrested and tried for his mistake for mishandling Kohlhaas’ case. As Herr Hinz von 
Tronka wonders how this issue could be so poorly handled by all the intelligent 
individuals in the room, he only receives “ungewisse[] Blicke[]” (58). Kleist 
demonstrates the confusion that the positive law can bring through empirical experience 
or interpretation. In any case, it is at least clear that there are two separate legal matters: 
the first one being Kohlhaas and his horses, and the second being Kohlhaas and his 
rebellion. If Kohlhaas’s matter regarding the black horses is to be reconsidered, there is 
nothing stopping the state from still arresting and prosecuting him for taking justice into 
his own hands and causing violence and vandalism. The Elector approves of Graf 
Wrede’s ideas and decides to restore due process to Kohlhaas (59). This incident is an 
example of how state institutions can be insufficient in resolving disputes. Another 
example occurs later in the narrative after Junker Wenzel is released form his temporary 
jail sentence and he is shamed publicly by his family. Junker Wenzel expressed remorse 
for the way he treated Kohlhaas and claimed that he did not really understand Kohlhaas’ 
situation with his horses (63). Junker Wenzel’s reaction further exemplifies the 
uncertainty of whether the state is competent enough to handle its citizens’ complaints. 
Junker Wenzel’s remorse could also be interpreted as superficial; he only shows remorse 
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because he knows that he will be held accountable, which is a stark contrast to his 
dismissive attitude toward Kohlhaas at Tronka Castle. 
 Kohlhaas re-embraces the positive law after having deemed himself an outcast 
earlier; this demonstrates that he is struggling with Kant’s idea that people must come 
together to form a lawful society to protect them from the state of nature, or 
Rechtlosigkeit (MS 151). As soon as Kohlhaas is informed that he may attempt his case 
again against Junker Wenzel, he immediately disbands the gang of men that helped him 
with his rebellion and gives away various weapons and items he accumulated during his 
revenge (60). Kohlhaas’ sudden shift from his personal maxim to again restoring his faith 
in the positive law seems almost as arbitrary as the state’s mishandling of his case and 
amnesty that was granted to him. Perhaps this almost comical shift from a Mordbrenner 
to a dutiful citizen who is petitioning the government expecting his case to be heard 
demonstrates the unlikelihood that Kohlhaas will be taken seriously by the state. As 
Kohlhaas rejected the state of Brandenburg, he revolted against society by doing harm to 
it. According to Kant, once one leaves society, one cannot come back. However, Kleist’s 
narrative seems to suggest that once one leaves society, one might possibly be able to 
return. For example, Kohlhaas’ suit is considered even after he views himself as an 
outcast. Kohlhaas is even delivered a punishment as per the recommendation of the law 
at the time in Brandenburg- execution. Kohlhaas is also acknowledged by his fellow 
townsfolk as well, for as Kohlhaas returns to his farm at Kohlhaasenbrück a throng of 
people follow him so they can get a glimpse of the celebrity like Robin Hood that he has 
become: 
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Die Nachricht, dass der Würgengel da sei, der die 
Volksbedrücker mit Feuer und Schwert verfolge, hatte ganz 
Dresden, Stadt und Vorstadt, auf die Beine gebracht; man 
musste die Haustür vor dem Andrang des neugierigen 
Haufens verriegeln, und die Jungen kletterten an den 
Fenstern heran, um den Mordbrenner, der darin frühstückte, 
in Augenschein zu sehen” (61). 
Kohlhaas is struggling with the Kantian notion of Ungerechtigkeit. In Kohlhaas’ case, he 
once considered himself a part of society, felt that he was cast out, and as soon as he is 
acknowledged by the state (his dealings with Luther and his amnesty) he is willing to 
restore his faith in the positive law and function within the framework of the justice 
system of Brandenburg. The likelihood that the state will also punish him for rebelling 
against society (even though Kohlhaas claimed he was cast out of society) indicates that 
if one leaves society, one will still be accountable for past actions. The public opinion 
also influences the attempt of the state to resolve Kohlhaas’ issues. For example, the 
state’s effort to locate Kohlhaas’ horses  is a long drawn out process with many rumors 
surrounding it (65-66). After the pair of Rappen thought to be Kohlhaas’ is located, 
Kohlhaas himself is contacted to verify with his own eyes in a public forum that they are 
his (70). Unfortunately this proceeding results in a riot, as the townspeople assault the 
Chamberlain and rip off his uniform, essentially robbing him of his identity and 
undermining the integrity of the state proceeding. The riots are inspired because a Meister 
Himbolt resisted the Chamberlain’s orders to his cousin to lead Kohlhaas’ horses away to 
be restored to their original condition. The public expressed their disapproval with 
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violence, which as previously discussed, Kant would consider illegitimate. With this 
scene, Kleist seems to suggest that the state is incompetent of maintaining order even 
when it puts forth a good faith effort. Additionally, a cynical public opinion about 
Michael Kohlhaas’ case develops in the wake of the riots, thus making the success of his 
case ever slimmer: 
Dieser Vorfall, so wenig der Roßhändler ihn in der Tat 
verschuldet hatte, erweckte gleichwohl, auch bei den 
Gemäßigtern und Besseren, eine, dem Ausgang seiner 
Streitsache höchst gefährliche Stimmung im Lande. Man 
fand das Verhältnis desselben zum Staat ganz unerträglich, 
und in Privathäusern und auf öffentlichen Plätzen erhob 
sich die Meinung, dass es besser sei, ein offenbares 
Unrecht an ihm zu verüben, und die ganze Sache von 
neuem niederzuschlagen, als ihm Gerechtigkeit, durch 
Gewalttaten ertrotzt, in einer so nichtigen Sache, zur bloßen 
Befriedigung seines rasenden Starrsinns, zukommen zu 
lassen (73). 
Prince Meissen even acknowledges that the sovereign’s reputation was likely damaged 
by this riot, which indicates that the state is aware that the people are losing faith in the 
law. Due to the various officials involved in Kohlhaas’ case, the state’s position is 
inconsistent towards him. On one hand, Prince Meissen wants to make sure that Kohlhaas 
has a fair trial and ensure that his amnesty will not be violated, and on the other hand the 
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Junker Wenzel’s family attempts to change the story to make the Junker seem innocent. 
The attempt at keeping the amnesty intact would still not guarantee Kohlhaas’ safety: 
Der Großkanzler, der gleichwohl die Gefahr, die über den 
Roßhändler schwebte, erkannte, tat sein Äußerstes, um die 
Sache desselben, bevor sie durch neue Ereignisse 
verwickelt und verworren würde, zu Ende zu bringen; dass 
aber wünschten und bezweckten die staatsklugen Ritter 
eben, und statt, wie zuvor, mit stillschweigendem 
Eingeständnis der Schuld, ihren Widerstand auf ein bloß 
gemildertes Rechterkenntnis einzuschränken, fingen sie 
jetzt an, in Wendungen arglistiger und rabulistischen Art, 
diese Schuld selbst gänzlich zu leugnen (79).  
The state’s inconsistencies demonstrate the problem that Kant discusses of an unjust 
government. Even the Prince of Meissen who wanted to make sure that Kohlhaas’ 
amnesty was not violated does not have a consistent presence. As Kohlhaas addressed his 
permission to travel to his home in Kohlhaasenbrück for a week to the Prince of Meissen, 
he instead receives a response from the Baron Siegfried von Wenk (80). Eventually, 
Kohlhaas is in fact able to return home and finds that his house has more guards than 
usual surrounding it. Kohlhaas feels that this is merely a show of justice by the state (81), 
a hunch that turns out to be accurate as the state eventually breaks his amnesty (82). 
 As soon as Kohlhaas’ amnesty is broken, he finds that he has become a prisoner 
of the state: 
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Kohlhaas fragte: ob er ein Gefangener wäre, und ob er 
glauben solle, dass die ihm feierlich, vor den Augen der 
ganzen Welt angelobte Amnestie gebrochen sei? Worauf 
der Freiherr sich plötzlich glutrot im Gesichte zu ihm 
wandte, und indem er dicht vor ihn trat, und ihm in das 
Auge sah, antwortete, “ja! ja! ja!” – ihm den Rücken 
zukehrte, ihn stehen ließ, und wieder zu den 
Nagelschmidtschen Knechten ging (85). 
This passage is significant because although the state official is able to confirm 
Kohlhaas’ status as a prisoner, the Freiherr does not offer any other explanation to 
Kohlhass’ state and immediately turns his back to him. As the Freiherr turns his back to 
Kohlhaas, it further complicates Kohlhaas’ situation since it seems meaningless, thus 
emphasizing how the state is acting in an arbitrary fashion. Because the state revoked 
Kohlhaas amnesty, Kohlhaas is actually relieved that he does not have to obey the 
restrictions of the amnesty (85). The revocation of his amnesty reawakens Kohlhaas’ 
drive for justice through his inner maxims, which is further discussed in the second 
chapter. 
 With regards to punishment, Kant takes a retributivist position in his justification 
of punishment under criminal law (Potter 179). Kant thinks that one should be punished 
with the same harm that one has committed; this is also known as the lex talionis, which 
is like the Biblical “an eye for an eye,” a tooth for a tooth” (Potter 179). Kohlhaas’ 
insistence on receiving his horses back in the same condition they were left is analogous 
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to Kant’s ideas regarding punishment and compensation for crimes. Kant’s take on 
punishment is the Prinzip der Gleichheit, or that the punishment must fit the crime: 
Also: was für unverschuldetes Übel du einem Anderen im 
Volke zu fügst, das thust du dir selbst an. Beschimpfst du 
ihn, so beschimpfst du dich selbst; bestiehlst du ihn, so be 
stiehlst du dich selbst; schlägst du ihn, so schlägst du dich 
selbst; tödtest du ihn, so tödtest du dich selbst (MS 174). 
Although Kohlhaas clearly disagrees with Kant with regards to rebellion, he 
clearly agrees to Kant’s Prinzip der Gleichheit. An example of this is when Kohlhaas 
exclaims: “das sind die Pferde nicht, die dreißig Goldgülden wert waren! Ich will meine 
wohlgenährten und gesunden Pferde wieder haben!“ is an extreme example of Kant’s 
Prinzip der Gleichheit (12). Kohlhaas does not just want any healthy horses back, but 
wants his horses back in exactly the same condition in which he left them. Kohlhaas, 
being denied his request by the Junker, leaves two of his horses and rides the third home.  
Er ließ die Gaule, ohne sich um sie zu bekümmern, auf dem 
Platz stehen, schwang sich, indem er versicherte, dass er 
sich Recht zu verschaffen wissen würde, auf seinen 
Braunen, und ritt davon (12). 
For Kant, the types of incentives one has to follow a law are directly related to the 
type of law it is and therefore will also dictate its punishment. An externally imposed law 
is one that deals with Recht, and exists only as a rule of Recht. For example, the 
Paßschein law does not carry with it any sort of pre-existing moral duty, but rather exists 
externally from our moral consciousness (Any ethical duties surrounding this sort of law 
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merely originate from the duty to follow laws of Recht). On the other hand, another law 
that Michael Kohlhaas violates is one prohibiting violent public disturbance, which 
would in fact codify a moral duty according to Kant. This is because even before a law 
prohibiting violent public disturbance was in place, one would still have the duty to 
follow this principle. The Rechtslehre, however, does not consider any inner moral 
motivation within an individual, but rather it considers only the external or coercive 
motivations like punishment (Potter 180): 
Kant, following in the social contract tradition of Hobbes, 
Locke, and Rousseau (and with differences from each), 
claims that we have an obligation to leave the state of 
nature, and enter into a political commonwealth. The 
purpose of this transition is so that the state can protect the 
rights to property and person that we already possess in the 
state of nature, but that are “provisional” and undefended 
so long as we remain in that state. That is, we are obliged to 
seek to create a commonwealth so that our rights and those 
of all others can be protected. The basic mechanism by 
which the state will protect these rights is the institution of 
criminal law, which forbids the broad range of acts that are 
violations of external rights, and which provides negative 
incentives through criminal punishment for violating those 
laws (Potter 183). 
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When Kohlhaas is charged with a breach of peace, he would eventually be 
sentenced to death by beheading, instead of his prior death sentence, which involved him 
being tortured before being burned. Dying by the sword was considered to be a more 
merciful death, which according to Kant would be the appropriate form of punishment for 
Kohlhaas. Kohlhaas does not object to his death sentence at the end of the novella since 
the state finally meets Kohlhaas’ original goal of the Junker restoring his horses and 
being punished. It is as if Kohlhaas shares Kant’s retributivist position on punishment; 
since his public disturbance has resulted in the death of others and destruction of personal 
property, it is only fair that he should die. Kant states that a criminal cannot complain that 
he is unfairly punished if his crime is merely brought back upon himself (MS 363). 
Kohlhaas does not complain, and Kleist’s narrator even comments that his last days in 
jail were some of the most peaceful and content days of his life: “Demnach glich nichts 
der Ruhe und Zufriedenheit seiner letzten Tage” (117). Additionally, it would make 
Kohlhaas seem a more honorable figure according to Kant, because a man of honor 
would rather die than live in shame (MS 333-334). Kohlhaas also receives the blessing of 
the Holy Communion from Luther; however, Kleist’s narrator indicates that the letter to 
this effect is “verloren gegangen” (117-118). Kohlhaas even follows typical legal matters 
one might do in preparation for death: he draws up a will and appoints a guardian for his 
children. Kohlhaas’ reacceptance of the positive law after achieving his maxim seems to 
show that Kleist suggests that the distinction between the positive law and moral 
principles are not always so clear, for even Kohlhaas himself, who is so focused on his 
own view of justice, cannot seem to tell the difference. 
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Kleist also appears to question the accessibility or transparency of the positive law. 
According to Kant, laws should be formed with a priori reason rather than being 
determined by statute and the state should also be divided into the legislative, executive, 
and judiciary powers (MS 151). The legislative branch is the law-maker (Gesetzgeber), 
the executive power administers the law, and the judicial power acts as a judge of the law 
(MS 151). However, in Michael Kohlhaas, the appearance of the mysterious amulet 
brings this organization of government and law-making into question, as it is 
unexplainable due to its mysterious origin and holds the secrets to the Saxon lineage. The 
Kurfürst tries to obtain the amulet because he receives word that it is of significance, yet 
Kohlhaas keeps it from him even though he has never bothered to open the amulet and 
read the contents. Kohlhaas keeps up the struggle to protect the amulet until his death, 
when he consumes the paper just before he dies: 
Kohlhaas löste sich, indem er, mit einem plötzlichen, die 
Wache, die ihn umringte, befremdenden Schritt, dicht vor 
ihn trat, die Kapsel von der Brust; er nahm den Zettel 
heraus, entsiegelte ihn, und überlas ihn […] steckte er ihn 
in den Mund und verschlang ihn (121).  
The amulet brings to question the accessibility of law and man’s ability to tell the 
future. The contents of the paper remain a mystery not only to everyone in the novella, 
but also to the reader. It is quite possible that nothing was written on the paper. In any 
case, the paper is an inaccessible document. Kleist is making a reference to the core of 
the law as being inaccessible. Since the paper inside the amulet supposedly predicted the 
Saxon lineage, Kleist may also have been suggesting with the paper’s inaccessibility that 
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although it is unlikely that anyone can accurately predict the future, humans have a 
fascination with prophecies. Kant disagreed with the ability to foretell the future, as he 
comments in Der Streit der Fakultäten that predicting future events can only be done 
with a priori reasoning and that this is only possible “wenn der Wahrsager die 
Begebenheiten selber macht und veranstaltet, die er zum Voraus verkündigt” (SdF 132). 
Kant’s idea of foreseeing the future in an a priori way would certainly leave out 
fortunetelling. However the amulet’s importance in the story emphasizes the fascination 
with just such fortunetelling. At one point in the story, the Kurfürst consults with two 
well-respected astrologists to help him get the amulet (116). Kleist seems to suggest that 
irrational concepts like prophecy or fortunetelling may influence a government’s actions 
or law-creation. Another example is when the Gypsy woman is trying to get Kohlhaas to 
give up the amulet to save his life, she hears the police coming and runs away with 
“plötzlicher Besorgnis” so she would not be caught (116). The narrative suggests that 
although humans may be influenced by prophecy, it cannot be openly mixed together in a 
government body. 
 Because Kohlhaas is not using his reason, his experience of the world is acted out 
in an arbitrary and capricious manner. The state’s lack of reason manifests itself in the 
arbitrary forming, and execution, of laws. The consequences of Kohlhaas’ rebellion, the 
arbitrary way his legal case was handled, and Kohlhaas’ eventual punishment and 
Kohlhaas entering and leaving the state of Rechtlosigkeit all confronts Kant’s ideas 
regarding freedom and the positive law.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
MICHAEL KOHLHAAS AND THE INNER MORAL LAW 
In his Kritik der praktischen Vernunft Kant seeks to outline a formula for morality 
and a theory of freedom. Kant asserts that it is possible for reason to guide one’s behavior 
without relying on empirical evidence or experience when making moral decisions. Kant 
explains that one can solely rely on reason in order to form a moral judgment, and the 
practicality of applying reason to our decision making process would explain not only the 
title, but the focus of the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft:  
Denn wenn sie als reine Vernunft wirklich praktisch ist, so 
beweist sie ihre und ihrer Begriffe Realität durch die Tat, 
und alles Vernünfteln wider die Möglichkeit, es zu sein, ist 
vergeblich (KpV 3). 
From the time Michael Kohlhaas discovers that his horses have been abused up 
until the time of his death, he seems to be following some sort of moral framework or 
principle.  Kohlhaas develops a wild obsession not only with attaining justice for himself, 
but also for his community. Kohlhaas is aware of the “Ungerechtigkeiten […] die täglich 
auf der Tronkenburg gegen die Reisenden verübt wurden” and therefore he decides to 
dedicate himself to the project, “Genugtuung für die erlittene Kränkung, und Sicherheit 
für zukünftige seinen Mitbürgern zu verschaffen” (12-13). The rest of the novella 
demonstrates that Sicherheit for Kohlhaas means his fellow citizens not having to suffer 
from arbitrary judgments, and the certainty that the legal institutions are fair. An ethical 
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standpoint for Kant dictates what one absolutely ought to do, which is determined 
through reason alone.  
The heart of Kant’s moral philosophy is found within a principle he formulates 
regarding pure practical reason, which is the Categorical Imperative: “Handle so, dass die 
Maxime deines Willens jederzeit zugleich als Prinzip einer allgemeinen Gesetzgebung 
gelten könne” (KpV 39). This rule seeks out to determine what one ought absolutely to 
do. Kant explains that “man soll schlechthin auf gewisse Weise verfahren” (KpV 40). 
Because the rule is unconditional, it is a priori and objective; therefore it is independent 
of empirical circumstances. The Categorical Imperative is not a method to decide on a set 
of actions to achieve a certain result (because this would be based on empirical 
circumstances), but rather it is a rule to be determined only through a priori reasoning. 
Laws developed through a priori reasoning are facts of reason, because they do not rely 
on empirical intuition. 
Man kann das Bewusstsein dieses Grundgesetzes ein 
Faktum der Vernunft nennen, weil man es nicht aus 
vorhergehenden Datis der Vernunft, z.B. dem Bewusstsein 
der Freiheit (denn dieses ist uns nicht vorher gegeben) 
herausvernünfteln kann, sondern weil es sich für sich selbst 
uns aufdringt als synthetischer Satz a priori, der auf keiner, 
weder reinen noch empirischen, Anschauung gegründet ist, 
ob er gleich analytisch sein würde, wenn man die Freiheit 
des Willens voraussetze, wozu aber, als positivem Begriffe, 
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eine intellektuelle Anschauung erfordert werden würde, die 
man hier gar nicht annehmen darf (KpV 41). 
If we apply Kant’s Categorical Imperative to Kohlhaas’ actions to see if his actions 
would be fit for universal law, it is immediately apparent that they are not suitable for 
practical law. This is because of the obvious realization that one should not be able to 
burn down towns because one has been treated unfairly. Thus, Kohlhaas lives on 
principle, or maxim. For Kant, a maxim is different from a practical law, since a maxim 
is a rule that has a particular result in view in order to achieve a specific end that one 
stays true to. For Kant, maxims do not have an ethical content to them, so Kohlhaas’ 
fixation on his principle of “Genugtuung für die erlittene Kränkung, und Sicherheit für 
zukünftige seinen Mitbürgern zu verschaffen” does not necessarily make him ethical (12-
13). Since both Kohlhaas’ actions and the motivational force driving Kohlhaas (or the 
fact that he lives by maxims) is a Kantian maxim, it seems as if Kleist wants to show us a 
world where Kantian motivation for the categorical imperative is not always readily 
apparent. The complexity and particularity of Michael Kohlhaas’ situation exemplifies 
how Kant’s system of ethics is too abstract to serve as a reliable way to make a moral 
choice and demonstrates limitations to reason. Kleist’s novella achieves this in various 
ways. Through the character of Michael Kohlhaas, Kleist tells the story of an educated 
man who is capable of thinking rationally and believes he does so throughout the entire 
novella; however, the extremist nature of his actions show that he is incapable of 
removing himself from his personal circumstances and therefore unable to separate his 
self from rational thought. This demonstrates a discrepancy between the moral character 
and empirical experience, which is introduced at the beginning of the novella as Michael 
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Kohlhaas is described as “einer der rechtschaffensten zugleich und entsetzlichsten 
Menschen seiner Zeit”. Kleist even explains the consequences of Kohlhaas’s extremist 
sense of justice: “sein “Rechtgefühl aber machte ihn zum Räuber und Mörder” (3). This 
opening description of Kohlhaas 
[…] is a conundrum not untypical of Kleist’s narratives as a 
whole. Contrasts are initially drawn in stark opposition to 
one another and propel the narrative to a conclusion that 
may or may not involve a resolution of such opposites. This 
is certainly so in the case of the character of Kohlhaas, 
where it is at first not obvious how innate “rectitude” 
(Rechtschaffenheit) could at all connect with 
“loathsomeness” (Entsetzlichkeit). The story announces a 
psychological dimension, inviting the reader to investigate 
Kohlhaas’ character in search of an answer to the 
conundrum, even if the exact nature of the loathsome 
rectitude or the upright loathsomeness still has to emerge in 
the course of the narrative (Mehigan 72).  
Kleist shows in the character Michael Kohlhaas that even the most rechtschaffende 
person is not necessarily moral, but rather can at the same time be the most loathsome. In 
Michael Kohlhaas, Kleist creates a world in which there is no room for Kantian 
motivation; Kleist’s and Kant’s views of human nature are ultimately at odds. Kohlhaas 
following the maxims he develops throughout the novella results in him resolving his 
original complaint about his horses, however he achieves this at the expense of his own 
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life.  The significance of Kohlhaas losing his life at the end raises important questions 
relating to the maxims by which Kohlhaas himself had lived and also the justice system 
that tried him. Kohlhaas develops his maxim to avenge those at Tronka Castle who 
wrongfully abused his horses only after he had a bad encounter with the Tronka Castle 
guards. In other words, Kohlhaas creates his ideals through an earth-shattering experience 
and he keeps creating new maxims throughout the novella as his situation changes; Kleist 
seems to be making a commentary on Kohlhaas’ confrontation with his own reality and 
moral code as a result of the empirical world: 
All [of Kleist’s] Novellen are expressions of metaphysical 
problems - not psychological problems primarily, though 
psychology plays a part in them. In all of the Novellen the 
characters are confronted with a situation, which shatters 
their belief in the world order and produces in them a state 
of mind which may be described as an agonized 
questioning in respect of the sum total of things. (Bennett) 
Kant explains that the difference between a subjective maxim and an objective 
practical law is one of subjectivity and objectivity. A maxim for Kant is subjective 
because its formation takes into account an individual’s perspective and personal 
circumstances, whereas a practical law is considered objective because it is formed 
considering the will of every rational being:  
Praktische Grundsätze sind Sätze, welche eine allgemeine 
Bestimmung des Willens enthalten, die mehrere praktische 
Regeln unter sich hat. Sie sind subjektiv oder Maximen, 
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wenn die Bedingung nur als für den Willen des Subjekts 
gültig von ihm angesehen wird; objektiv aber oder 
praktische Gesetze, wenn jene als objektiv, d.i. für den 
Willen jedes vernünftigen Wesens gültig erkannt wird 
(KpV 24). 
As Michael Kohlhaas tries to redress the wrong he suffered by having his horses 
abused and being fooled into thinking he needed a passport to cross the Brandenburg 
border, he vows to ensure that the atrocities at Tronka castle stop happening to both 
himself and others in his community. Kohlhaas’ desire to not only seek justice for 
himself, but also for others would make him appear to be acting within the scope of a 
Kantian practical, and thus universal, principle. However, for Kant, a practical principle 
can only come from reason, which is why it applies to everyone, in contrast to principles 
formed through experience, like a religious moral code (KpV 24). Throughout the 
novella, whenever Kohlhaas confronts divinely inspired morality (for example, the piece 
of scripture his wife reads on her death bed or the figure of Martin Luther) he resists it 
and instead attempts to use his own reason to determine what he ought to do in his 
particular situation.  
Despite Kohlhaas’ dire situation, the decisions and principles he forms could not 
be considered Kantian universal principles because not only are these principles formed 
by empirical circumstances, but they cannot be considered as acceptable for everyone 
under all circumstances to repeat. In his Kritik der praktischen Vernunft Kant gives the 
example of someone adopting the maxim to not tolerate any unavenged offense to 
exemplify how this concept cannot be considered an objective practical law that can be 
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adopted for the will of every rational being because it would be inconsistent (KpV 24). 
This is because the circumstances of not tolerating any unavenged offense would differ 
from person to person and thus not be based on a universal principle. Kant describes 
practical rules as a product of reason because actions are always thought out to achieve a 
certain result: “Die praktische Regel ist jederzeit ein Produkt  der Vernunft, weil sie 
Handlung als Mittel zur Wirkung als Absicht vorschreibt” (KpV 24). This example is 
very relevant to Kohlhaas’ legal problem, and in its light we could assume Kant to argue 
that Kohlhaas is living by maxims, and not by a practical universal law. Kohlhaas does, 
however, experience a desire to be moral:  
 Denn ein richtiges, mit der gebrechlichen Einrichtung der 
Welt schon bekanntes Gefühl machte ihn, trotz der 
erlittenen Beleidigungen, geneigt, falls nur wirklich dem 
Knecht, wie der Schloßvoigt behauptete, eine Art von 
Schuld beizumessen sei, den Verlust der Pferde, als eine 
gerechte Folge davon, zu verschmerzen. Dagegen sagte 
ihm ein ebenso vortreffliches Gefühl, und dies Gefühl 
fasste tiefere Wurzeln, in dem Maße, als er weiter ritt, und 
überall, wo er einkehrte, von den Ungerechtigkeiten hörte, 
die täglich auf der Tronkenburg gegen den 
Ungerechtigkeiten hörte, die täglich auf der Tronkenburg 
gegen die Reisenden verübt wurden: dass, wenn der ganze 
Vorfall, wie es allen Anschein habe, bloß abgekartet sein 
sollte, er mit seinen Kräften der Welt in der Pflicht 
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verfallen sei, sich Genugtuung für die erlittene Kränkung, 
und Sicherheit für zukünftige seinen Mitbürgern zu 
verschaffen (13).  
Experiencing a universal vision justice does not however mean that one is in a position to 
enact practical laws with this type of reasoning. When Kohlhaas learns about the injuries 
his servant Herse suffered while looking after the horses, Kohlhaas does not react 
emotionally but instead seems to attempt to operate from an objective point of view. 
Instead of immediately believing the story he was told by his wife that Herse was abused, 
Kohlhaas instead investigates the matter for himself, even after seeing Herse’s injuries. 
Kohlhaas asks Herse a series of questions about what happened, which almost seems to 
be like putting Herse through a tribunal. Only after he has reconfirmed what happened to 
Herse, Kohlhaas decides to write a letter to the Junker Wenzel von Tronka to settle the 
matter: 
Hier verfasste er, mit Hülfe eines Rechtsgelehrten, den er 
kannte, eine Beschwerde, in welcher er, nach einer 
umständlichen Schilderung des Frevels, den der Junker 
Wenzel von Tronka, an ihm sowohl, als an seinem Knecht 
Herse, verübt hatte, auf gesetzmäßige Bestrafung 
desselben, Wiederherstellung der Pferde in den vorigen 
Stand, und auf Ersatz des Schadens antrug, den er sowohl, 
als sein Knecht, dadurch erlitten hatten. Die Rechtssache 
war in der Tat klar (19). 
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 Kohlhaas however doesn’t just seek justice for those closest to him like Herse but also 
for all the people who have been wronged at Tronka Castle. At this point in the novella, it 
appears that Kohlhaas is in fact adopting a Kantian universal perspective. The way in 
which Kleist words this passage seems to indicate that Kohlhaas isn’t just personally 
motivated. The ambiguity of Kohlhaas’ motivations seems to be a commentary by Kleist 
regarding the ambiguity of Kantian morality.  
As the revenge of Michael Kohlhaas begins to unfold, Kleist inserts commentary 
that emphasizes Kohlhaas’ shift in his concept of justice in Brandenburg as it has 
revealed itself in his legal case. As Kohlhaas and Herse return to Tronka Castle to search 
for the Junker Wenzel, Kleist’s narrator writes: “Der Engel des Gerichts fährt also vom 
Himmel herab” (33).  Kleist calling Kohlhaas an angel of judgment before he terrorizes 
Tronka castle and kills some of the people in it makes it clear Kohlhaas is seeking 
righteousness outside of a system that failed him, which Kant would disagree with as he 
argues against rebellion in Metaphysik der Sitten. Kohlhaas feels that the complications 
he experienced in filing his legal case have taken away any sense of freedom he might 
experience under protection of the sovereign in the Kantian sense, which causes him to 
take matters into his own hands. Perhaps Kleist describing Kohlhaas as an angel 
descending from heaven is a mockery of his self-righteousness or boldness. It 
nevertheless represents that Kohlhaas has turned inward to his own personal values and 
his desire to resolve his legal issue through his personal principles and maxims.  
Kohlhaas’ perceived unreliability of the positive laws of Brandenburg and his 
subsequent violent reaction emphasizes the Kantian connection between justice and 
order. When Kohlhaas’ petition is rejected he feels that he was unjustly treated and that 
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therefore the state of Brandenburg lacks any sort of order, making his violent actions 
justifiable: “Mitten durch den Schmerz, die Welt in einer so ungeheueren Unordnung zu 
erblicken, zuckte die innerliche Zufriedenheit empor, seine eigne Brust nunmehr in 
Ordnung zu sehen” (24). As previously mentioned, the Rechtslehre addresses how 
societies form laws to protect men from an unregulated state of nature; Kohlhaas’ 
reaction to the rejection his petition and the crimes he subsequently commits in order to 
gain justice indicate that he has shifted his focus from the positive laws of Brandenburg 
to his own moral motivations. At this point for Kohlhaas, he does not just want his horses 
back, but rather he wants the right to get his horses back (Mehigan 77). He becomes 
someone, “dem es nicht um die Pferde zu tun war – er hätte gleichen Schmerz 
empfunden, wenn es ein Paar Hunde gegolten hätte” (23). Another example of Kohlhaas 
becoming obsessed with his principle is after Tronka Castle is burned down and 
Kohlhaas violently forces a stable boy to rescue the Rappen from the burning shed. 
Gleichwohl, als der Knecht schreckenblaß, wenige 
Momente bevor der Schuppen hinter ihm zusammenstürzte, 
mit den Pferden, die er an der Hand hielt, daraus hervortrat, 
fand er den Kohlhaas nicht mehr; und da er sich zu den 
Knechten auf den Schloßplatz begab, und den Roßhändler, 
der ihm mehreremal den Rücken zukehrte, fragte: was er 
mit den Tieren nun anfangen solle? – hob dieser plötzlich, 
mit einer fürchterlichen Gebärde, den Fuß, dass der Tritt, 
wenn er ihn getan hätte, sein Tod gewesen wäre: bestieg, 
ohne ihm zu antworten, seinen Braunen, setzte sich unter 
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das Tor der Burg, und erharrte, inzwischen die Knechte ihr 
Wesen forttrieben, schweigend den Tag (34-35). 
Kohlhaas’ behavior in this passage indicates that he has become obsessed with his 
principle of living in an orderly and just Brandenburg; for Kohlhaas this means having 
the right to have his horses back. Even though he already has them, he is still not satisfied 
because he still wants to see the Junker von Wenzel punished. So, because Kohlhaas does 
not feel that the positive laws of Brandenburg offer protection to its citizens, which he 
has the right to reject all of the laws of Brandenburg by causing a public disturbance in 
order to get what he wants. This even drives him to publish his first Kohlhaasisches 
Mandat which constitutes an attempt by Kohlhaas to draft his own legislation for his own 
purpose, stating that the Junker Wenzel von Tronka must be turned over to Kohlhaas and 
anyone hiding him will be punished on pain of death (35). Kohlhaas releases several 
more Mandats after his first, using different ways to address the people in order to get 
their attention. One was addressed to “jeden guten Christen” and another he described 
himself as “einen Reichs – und Weltfreien,  Gott allein unterworfenen Herrn” which 
Kleist describes Kohlhaas’ behavior as “eine Schwärmerei krankhafter und 
mißgeschaffener Art” (38). Despite Kohlhaas’ fanaticism, Kohlhaas had gained a group 
of about 30 men who supported him (38). 
As previously stated, Kohlhaas’ motivations for his quest for justice would be 
considered a Kantian maxim because they are based on material circumstances and not 
universal accepted principles. Kant emphasizes that material circumstance 
(Begehrungsvermögen) is empirical, so it cannot be considered a practical law. When the 
conception of a particular outcome or “Begehrungsvermögen” precedes the practical rule, 
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then this must be empirical according to Kant because it was not derived from a priori 
thought (KpV 26). Michael Kohlhaas creates another manifesto that is based on his desire 
to not only achieve justice, but to punish the Junker Wenzel von Tronka. Kleist 
emphasizes how obsessed with his cause Kohlhaas has become at this point because he 
presents himself as 
einen Statthalter Michaels des Erzengels, der gekommen 
sei, an allen, die in dieser Streitsache des Junkers Partei 
ergreifen würden, mit Feuer und Schwert, die Arglist, in 
welcher die ganze Welt versunken sei, zu bestrafen (45). 
Kleist also describes how Kohlhaas signed his manifesto with a certain fury: 
“Gegeben auf dem Sitz unserer provisorischen Weltregierung, dem Erzschlosse zu 
Lützen (45). The way that Kohlhaas signed his manifesto is an attempt to raise his 
authority as originating outside and above the state. He thinks his authority is outside the 
realm of the sovereign as he mentions a “world order”. This demonstrates how Kohlhaas 
has rejected state authority to embrace his inner maxims, which he not only holds himself 
to, but he also projects them onto the world. His inner maxims are also directly connected 
to his happiness and well-being, which according to Kant, cannot serve as a practical 
principle. Seeking  happiness or positive experiences, according to Kant, is founded in 
self-love (KpV 27). Seeking happiness depends on prior experiences and not someone’s 
understanding of an object or concept (KpV 27): 
Die Lust aus der Vorstellung der Existenz einer Sache, 
sofern sie ein Bestimmungsgrund des Begehrens dieser 
Sache sein soll, gründet sich auf der Empfänglichkeit des 
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Subjekts, weil sie von dem Dasein eines Gegenstandes 
abhängt; mithin gehört sie dem Sinne (Gefühl) und nicht 
dem Verstande an, der eine Beziehung der Vorstellung auf 
ein Objekt nach Begriffen, aber nicht auf das Subjekt nach 
Gefühlen ausdrückt (KpV 22). 
Kohlhaas’ failures in pursuit of his legal case cause him to focus on his own 
maxims to achieve justice, which seems to be linked to Kohlhaas’ happiness as well. 
After the state revokes Kohlhaas’ amnesty, Kohlhaas receives correspondence from 
Nagelschimidt and he reverts back to relying on his inner maxims. However, Kohlhaas 
has begun to lose hope and is no longer obsessed with acting as a Robin Hood-like figure 
against the state of Brandenburg and Tronka Castle, but rather wishes to flee and search 
for his own personal happiness:  
Seine Absicht war, mit seinen fünf Kindern nach Hamburg 
zu gehen, und sich von dort nach der Levante oder nach 
Ostindien, oder so weit der Himmel über andere Menschen, 
als die er kannte, blau war, einzuschiffen: denn die 
Dickfütterung der Rappen hatte seine, von Gram sehr 
geleugte Seele auch unabhängig von dem Widerwillen, mit 
dem Nagelschmidt deshalb gemeinschaftliche Sache zu 
machen, aufgegeben (89). 
According to Kant, Kohlhaas’ desire for personal happiness could not become the 
basis for a practical law. To explain this concept, Kant gives the example of the man who 
wants to spend money; the man does not care where the gold was mined as long as he can 
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spend the gold anywhere and everywhere it has the same value. This metaphor relates to 
Kohlhaas, because like Kohlhaas, the man spending the money is not interested in sense 
or understanding (“Verstandes- oder Sinnesvorstellungen”), but instead focused on how 
much pleasure he can find (KpV 29). Likewise, Kohlhaas is not necessarily focused on 
making sense of his legal problem anymore, but rather is seeking a place where he can 
find personal happiness. Kant argues that a desire or even demand of happiness cannot be 
a law, because achieving happiness does not have the same determining ground for the 
will of all rational beings in all situations (KpV 31-32). Kant explains: 
Denn obgleich der Begriff der Glückseligkeit der 
praktischen Beziehung der Objekte aufs 
Begehrungsvermögen allerwärts zum Grunde liegt, so ist er 
doch nur der allgemeine Titel der subjektiven 
Bestimmungsgründe und bestimmt nichts spezifisch, darum 
es doch in dieser praktischen Aufgabe allein zu tun ist, und 
ohne welche Bestimmung sie gar nicht aufgelöst werden 
kann (KpV 32). 
Thus, practical precepts based on happiness or achieving happiness can never be 
universal because they cannot be considered to be based on universal principles (KpV 
32). Kant explains that principles of self-love or desire may contain a universal rule of 
skill (Geschicklichkeit), but are merely theoretical. So, Kohlhaas’ search for happiness 
may be considered a theoretical principle or rule. Kohlhaas wanting justice through 
rebellion is not a practical principle based on will, but rather a possible action that may 
bring about a certain outcome (KpV 32-33). Even if Kohlhaas can show the others 
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engaging in a sort of vigilante justice along with him are unanimous in their desires for 
happiness, according to Kant they still cannot form the basis for practical law because 
their unanimity is contingent on something, which in this case would be unfair execution 
of the laws and denying citizens due process in Brandenburg (KpV 33). Kant maintains 
therefore that there may be no practical laws based on desires, but merely advice on how 
to achieve our desires; one cannot elevate a subjective principle to a practical law: 
So würde das Prinzip der Selbstliebe dennoch von ihnen durchaus für kein praktisches 
Gesetz ausgegeben werden können; denn diese Einhelligkeit wäre selbst doch nur 
zufällig (KpV 33). 
 Kohlhaas is not the only one in Kleist’s novella who is driven by maxims in an 
attempt to gain happiness and protection of the law. The Kurfürst along with Lady 
Heloise encounters Kohlhaas one day after a hunting trip as he is lodging outside of 
Dresden. As Lady Heloise inquires about the amulet around his neck, he recounts the 
story of a gypsy woman who gave the amulet to him. Never having seen the mysterious 
gypsy woman before, he learned from her that the object was „Ein Amulet, Kohlhaas, der 
Roßhändler; verwahr es wohl, es wird dir dereinst das Leben retten!” (97) The narrative 
at this point reveals that Kohlhaas throughout the entire novella has been safeguarding 
this mysterious amulet that contained a prophecy indicating the identity of the last ruler 
of the Saxon lineage, yet he never even bothered to read this prophecy even out of 
curiosity. This moves the Kurfürst to the point of unconsciousness: 
Er müsse ihm nur gestehen, dass der Anblick eines 
nichtigen Zettels, den der Mann in einer bleiernen Kapsel 
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mit sich führe, schuld an dem ganzen unangenehmen Zufall 
sei, der ihm zugestoßen (98). 
At this point, the Kurfürst develops the intention, or maxim, to uncover the 
content of the paper inside Kohlhaas’ amulet. The Kurfürst is so obsessed with this goal 
that he is willing to take advantage of his power to do this.  He tries to influence 
Kohlhaas’ case in a positive way so Kohlhaas will not be sentenced to death; the Kurfürst 
even tries to pardon Kohlhaas for his crimes in exchange for the amulet (101). Once 
Kohlhaas learns that a man of high rank like the Kurfürst wants to get his amulet, 
Kohlhaas develops a new maxim to guard it further and refuses to give in to any bargain 
from the Kurfürst: 
Der Roßhändler sagte, eingedenk der unedelmütigen und 
unfürstlichen Behandlung, die er in Dresden, bei seiner 
gänzlichen Bereitwilligkeit, alle nur möglichen Opfer zu 
bringen, hatte erfahren müssen: dass er den Zettel behalten 
wolle (101). 
It is significant that Kohlhaas develops this maxim purely out of a reaction to counter the 
Kurfürst’s desire to have the amulet. Kohlhaas is so blinded by his maxim that he loses 
sight of the amulet’s intended purpose. The mysterious gypsy woman appears again and 
advises him to give up the amulet not just for his own sake, but the sake of his children, 
as she had prophesied that it would one day “[sein] Leben retten” (97). He insists that he 
is in fact staying true to his principle of not giving up the amulet for his children, as even 
they would approve of his decision when they were older (115). He then shares another 
maxim: 
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“Wer mir sein Wort einmal gebrochen,” sprach er, “mit 
dem wechsle ich keins mehr, und nur deine Forderung, 
bestimmt und unzweideutig, trennt mich, gutes Mütterchen, 
von dem Blatt, durch welches mir für alles, was ich erlitten, 
auf so wunderbare Weise Genugtuung geworden ist” (115). 
If one thinks of a maxim as a practical universal law, it can really only be because of the 
form of the maxim, and not the content of the maxim, as Kant explains:  
Also kann ein vernünftiges Wesen sich seine subjektiv-
praktischen Prinzipen d. i. Maximen entweder gar nicht 
zugleich als allgemeine Gesetze denken, oder es muß 
annehmen, dass die bloße Form derselben, nach der jene 
sich zur allgemeinen Gesetzgebung schicken, sie für sich 
allein zum praktischen Gesetze mache (KpV 34). 
Kohlhaas’ above maxim is a principle formed by a will based on empirical circumstances 
(his lack of success to have his lawsuit dealt with in a serious manner) so his principle 
cannot be universal. Additionally, Kohlhaas keeps developing new maxims that progress 
along with this empirical experience in the novella. According to Kant, Kohlhaas’ maxim 
could never serve as a universal principle. Kohlhaas’ maxim also causes him to lose sight 
of the intended life-saving purpose of the amulet. Kohlhaas now is motivated by two 
maxims: the return of his healthy horses and protecting his amulet. Kleist seems to be 
giving a cynical example though the character of Kohlhaas that justice and moral 
principles are only available to mankind on pain of death, and even when they are 
achieved they do not necessarily bring one happiness or moral freedom. Mehigan writes: 
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There is a deep sense of irony in the outcome to this story 
in which Kohlhaas, to whom respect for his person and the 
conduct of his lawsuit are supremely important, is obliged 
to consent to his own beheading. In a scene of primal 
violence, Kohlhaas literally achieves – that is precisely his 
destiny as a rational man – both the status of the lifeless 
marionette, and the “infinite” (but also disembodied) 
consciousness of a god (Kohlhaas is given foreknowledge 
of the future lineage of the Saxon dynasty). The final 
outcome of rational self-consciousness, for all its benefits 
for Kohlhaas personally, thus cannot be construed as 
beneficial for the rest of human kind (Mehigan 28-29). 
Michael Kohlhaas’ situation shows how Kant’s system of ethics is too abstract to 
serve as a reliable way to make a moral choice and demonstrates limitations to reason. 
Although Kohlhaas has attempted to use his reason throughout the entire novella, in order 
to obtain justice he must die at the end. The inability of Michael Kohlhaas to remove 
himself from his personal circumstances prevents him from separating himself from his 
rational thought. Since the lack of universality of Kohlhaas’ actions and the motivational 
force driving Kohlhaas does not make his actions fit to be universal laws, it seems as if 
Kleist is questioning the circumstances for creating both positive laws and moral practical 
principles with Kant’s method, which is exclusively using a priori reasoning. Kohlhaas is 
an educated man, yet his inability to remove himself from his personal circumstances 
escalates to the point where Kleist’s novella questions whether one can possibly separate 
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oneself from one’s circumstances to not only make rational moral decisions, but also to 
enable the state to make rational laws. The discrepancy between the moral character and 
empirical experience, or between a piece of legislation on paper and how it will be 
enforced, demonstrates a limit to reason in the Kantian moral system.  
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